Resisting Correction: How RLHF Makes Language Models Ignore External Safety Signals in Natural Conversation

arXiv:2601.08842v1 Announce Type: new
Abstract: Safety architectures for language models increasingly rely on external monitors to detect errors and inject corrective signals at inference time. For such systems to function in interactive settings, models must be able to incorporate externally provided confidence information into their verbal responses. In this work, we test whether instruction-tuned language models preserve this controllability across different interaction modes.
Using Llama-3.2-3B on GSM8K, we perform a causal intervention study in which explicit external confidence signals are injected and model compliance is measured under multiple prompt strategies. We find that base models exhibit near-perfect controllability (Spearman rho close to 1.0), while instruction-tuned models display a striking context dependence: they fully comply with external corrections under explicit command prompts (bias approximately 0 percent, rho = 0.93), yet systematically ignore the same signals in natural conversational queries (bias plus 40 percent, rho = 0.04).
This behavior is not a capability failure; the model can process the signal, but an emergent property of RLHF optimization that prioritizes conversational fluency over external calibration cues in natural dialogue. We further show that internal token-level confidence in small models is uninformative (r = 0.035), underscoring the necessity of external supervision. Our findings highlight a deployment-critical failure mode: the interaction style users expect is precisely where safety corrections are least effective.